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By John E. Golob and David G. Bishop
W
hen investors make financial plans,
their strategies depend on the returns
they expect from investments in the
stock market. The expected returns from stocks
affect how much investors save, how long they
plan to work, and how they allocate their port-
folios among alternative investments. Their
strategies are most likely to be successful, of
course, when they have realistic expectations
about stock returns.
Over the past several years, stock returns have
exceeded their long-run historical averages.
For example, the 15 percent average annual
return on stocks over the last decade is substan-
tially higher than the 10 percent average return
over the previous 100 years. Stock returns were
particularly high in 1995 and 1996, averaging
almost 30 percent for the S&P 500 stock index.
Market observers have reacted to high
stock returns in different ways. Many individual
investors, for example, interpret recent mar-
ket strength as the beginning of a new era, with
15 percent returns continuing into the fore-
seeable future. In contrast, market professionals
are generally less optimistic. Indeed, some ana-
lysts interpret high stock prices as an indication
that future returns will be below their historical
average.
This article analyzes how macroeconomic
fundamentals and high price-earnings ratios on
stocks will affect long-run returns. The first
section reviews the stock market’s recent perfor-
mance and describes how investors and analysts
have reacted to this performance. The second
section shows how macroeconomic trends
imply that long-run returns will remain close
to their 10 percent historical average. The
third section analyzes the long-run relation-
ship between price-earnings ratios and returns.
The section shows that high price-earnings ratios
are consistent with lower long-run returns, and
argues returns may have declined because the
stock market is perceived as less risky. 
I. RECENT VERSUS HISTORICAL
MARKET PERFORMANCE 
The strength of the stock market has led to
diverse opinions about future stock returns.
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the Federal Reserve System.While many individual investors expect the high
returns of the past decade to continue, many
market professionals are concerned that returns
will fall. This section compares the stock market’s
recent performance with its historical perfor-
mance, and discusses how market observers
have reacted to recent market strength.
Stock investors have received higher returns
in recent years than they have received over
longer historical periods. Total returns on the
S&P 500 index, which include the effects of
price increases and dividends, have averaged
more than 17 percent per year since the 1982
lows.
1 As a result, this index was recently more
than nine times higher than it was during the
1982 recession.
2 The consistency of recent
market strength can be illustrated by averaging
returns over ten-year intervals to smooth out
annual volatility. Average ten-year returns have
been in the vicinity of 15 percent since 1984
(Chart 1).
3 These mid-teen returns, of course,
are substantially above the 10 percent average
returns over longer historical periods (Siegel).
4
Another measure of stock market performance is
the length of time since returns on market indexes
have declined significantly over the course of a year
(Chart 1). Prior to 1974, stock prices usually
declined significantly about every five years.
Since 1974, stock returns have been positive in
every year except 1987, when the year-over-year
return was only slightly negative.
5 With only one
small year-over-year decline in 23 years, this
Chart 1



























6 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYpost-1974 period is unprecedented in U.S. stock
market history extending back to 1802 (Schwert).
High stock market returns have been driven
primarily by rising stock prices. This has led
many analysts to conclude that stock prices are
now too high. When analysts say stock prices
are too high, of course, they are comparing
prices to commonly used fundamental measures
of stock value, such as book value, dividends,
and earnings. Book value is established by
accountants and reported on a company’s bal-
ance sheet as the value of its assets minus the
value of its liabilities. The S&P Industrials
index, which is the industrial component of the
S&P 500, recently rose to five times its book value
(Chart 2).
6 The index has averaged only two times
book value since 1950, so the index is more than
double its average relative to book value. 
A second fundamental measure of stock
value is the dividend yield, which is the annual
dividend divided by the price of the stock. When
a stock’s price rises faster than its dividend, the
dividend yield declines. Some analysts inter-
pret a dividend yield below 3 percent as a sign
of market overvaluation. The dividend yield
for the S&P 500 index has averaged 4.8 per-
cent since 1871 and has averaged 4 percent
since 1950. In November 1996 the dividend
yield on the S&P 500 index dropped below 2
percent for the first time ever (Chart 3). Since
then, the yield has remained below 2 percent
most of the time.
Chart 2


















ECONOMIC REVIEW · THIRD QUARTER 1997 7A third fundamental measure of stock value is
the price-earnings (P/E) ratio. The P/E ratio for
the S&P 500 index has averaged about 14 since
1871 (Chart 4). Recently, the P/E ratio on the
index rose above 21, more than 50 percent above
its long-run average. Not only is the P/E ratio
above average, but some analysts suggest the
ratio should be below average because the econ-
omy has been expanding for so long. Stock
prices reflect expectations for future earnings.
Because earnings typically grow slower as eco-
nomic expansions mature, prices tend to fall
relative to current earnings. 
Recent market strength has led many individ-
ual investors to become very optimistic about
future stock returns. For example, when Louis
Harris and Associates recently polled over 1,000
mutual fund investors, a surprising 75 percent
predicted that returns in the next decade will either
equal or exceed the returns in the past decade
(Easton). But, is this optimism warranted? 
Most professional market analysts are skepti-
cal, for two reasons. First, many of them think
that stock prices are too high relative to funda-
mental measures of their value. For example,
Larry Smith, the head of asset allocation at J. P.
Morgan, recently noted that stocks are as over-
valued as at any time since 1987 (Zuckerman).
Analysts are concerned because high stock prices
in the past have typically been followed by
below-average returns (Cochrane and Shiller;
Fama and French). Given this evidence, many
Chart 3



















8 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYanalysts forecast that near-term returns will be
less than the 10 percent achieved historically.
A few analysts even forecast substantial declines
in stock prices over the next year (Welling).
Analysts have a second reason to be skeptical
of continued 15 percent stock returns. Decade-
long periods of high average returns are not
unprecedented, and past episodes did not fore-
tell any permanent rise in long-run returns.
Through the 1950s, for example, average ten-
year returns were even higher than during the
recent decade, peaking at more than 23 percent
in 1956 (Chart 1). High stock returns during the
1950s, of course, did not signal the beginning of
a new era. Rather, stock returns were low during
the 1960s and early 1970s, and the ten-year
return almost declined to zero in 1974.
II. STOCK RETURNS AND THE
MACROECONOMY 
Although the stock market’s past performance
suggests that 15 percent returns may not be
sustained, the future could differ from the past.
The factors that determine long-run economic
growth, such as productivity, the labor force, and
the capital stock, also affect corporate earnings
and stock prices. This section shows, however,
that recent trends in productivity, the labor force,
and the capital stock will not change long-run
returns much from their historical average,
which has been in the vicinity of 10 percent.
An important constraint on long-run stock
returns is the growth of corporate earnings.
Stock returns include dividend payments and
Chart 4



















1871 1881 1891 1901 1911 1921 1931 1941 1951 1961 1971 1981 1991
ECONOMIC REVIEW · THIRD QUARTER 1997 9changes in stock prices, and prices grow over the
long run at approximately the same rate as earn-
ings. For example, the S&P 500 index has grown
7.7 percent per year on average since 1922,
while earnings have grown 7.6 percent per year
on average (Chart 5). If dividend yields remain
in the vicinity of 2 percent, stock prices would
have to grow 13 percent per year to generate 15
percent returns. As a result, earnings would also
have to grow 13 percent per year, which is much
faster than earnings have grown historically.
Thus far, corporate earnings do not appear to
be accelerating. From 1982 to 1996 corporate
earnings grew 7.8 percent per year on average,
which is about the same as the 7.6 percent aver-
age rate over the past 75 years (Chart 5). Earn-
ings have risen more rapidly since 1991, but the
gains are comparable to those in previous busi-
ness expansions. Returns have been high, of
course, but primarily because stock prices have
risen faster than earnings. 
A traditional economic growth model is useful
for analyzing whether corporate earnings can
grow faster. In the context of a growth model,
the question becomes, will the return to capital
rise? In growth models, capital refers to real physi-
cal assets, such as factories, business equipment,
office buildings, land, and residential housing.
The return to capital is the income paid to those
who own the capital, expressed as a percentage
of the initial capital. Much of the physical capi-
tal in the economy, of course, is owned through
Chart 5























10 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYcorporations. Thus, a rise in the return to capital
implies higher corporate earnings.
7 
In models of economic growth, the return to
capital depends on how much the economy
produces and on how this economic output is
shared between those who work and those who
own the capital. Economic output depends on
three factors: capital, labor, and total factor pro-
ductivity, which is a measure of how efficiently
the economy converts capital and labor inputs into
economic output.
8 Economists estimate that 70
percent of national income is paid to workers,
and the remaining 30 percent is paid to those
who own the capital (Abel and Bernanke).
9
Although these shares vary a little over the
business cycle, the shares have remained surpris-
ingly stable when averaged over entire business
cycles. Economists first observed the constant
labor and capital shares in manufacturing
income between 1889 and 1922 (Humphrey).
The shares have remained stable through the
post-World War II era (Chart 6).
10 
Assuming the labor and capital shares of
income remain constant, it is possible to calcu-
late how trends in productivity, the labor force,
and the capital stock affect the return to capital.
Two of these factors, productivity and the labor
force, have a similar effect on the return to
capital.
11 As these two factors grow, economic
output, capital income, and the return to capital
all rise. Growth in the capital stock, however,
has the opposite effect on the return to capital.
Chart 6
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ECONOMIC REVIEW · THIRD QUARTER 1997 11If the capital stock rises faster than the labor
force, capital will be less productive, which will
tend to reduce the return to capital. The Bureau
of Labor Statistics estimates that the labor force
will grow 1.05 percent per year over the next
decade (Fullerton). Assuming trends of the
last decade continue, capital will grow 2.8
percent per year and total factor productivity
will grow 0.72 percent per year (Chart 7).
12
These trends, coupled with a 30 percent capital
share, imply that capital currently returning
10 percent annually will return 9.5 percent
annually after ten years.
13 That is, contrary to
the expectations of many individual inves-
tors, the model predicts the return to capital
will decline slightly.
Forecasts of changes in the return to capital
are potentially sensitive to forecasts of macroe-
conomic trends. Fortunately, the forecasts do not
vary enough to affect the general conclusion of
this section. Consider productivity growth as an
example. Many economists contend that official
estimates of productivity growth are under-
stated because the consumer price index over-
states inflation (Boskin and others). Higher
productivity growth would raise the return to
capital. If total factor productivity is growing
1 percent per year faster than assumed above,
capital currently returning 10 percent annually
would return 10.5 percent annually after ten
years.
14 Thus, even with higher productivity
growth, the model does not predict that stock
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12 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYfact, productivity growth would have to rise to
about 6 percent for returns to rise from 10 to 15
percent over the course of a decade.
III.COULD HIGH STOCK PRICES BE
A SIGN OF LOWER LONG-RUN
RETURNS?
Based on recent macroeconomic trends, indi-
vidual investors appear excessively optimistic
about future stock returns. In contrast, many
market professionals interpret high stock prices
as a signal that future long-run returns will be
below average. This section shows that recent
stock prices are consistent with a modest reduc-
tion in future long-run returns, and suggests
investors may have become willing to accept
these lower returns because they are less con-
cerned about stock market risk. 
What is the relationship between stock
prices and long-run returns?
Some analysts contend that stock prices are
high because investors are willing to accept
lower future long-run returns on stocks. This
relationship is true of assets in general. For
example, bond prices rise as bond yields decline.
This relationship may also explain high stock
prices. The plausibility of this explanation, how-
ever, depends on whether the decline in long-run
returns implied by recent price-earnings ratios
is reasonable. This section calculates how much
long-run returns would have to decline from
their historical average to justify the recent high
stock prices.
When analysts say that stock prices are high,
they are typically comparing stock prices to
some fundamental measure of stock value. Most
analysts believe the price-earnings ratio is better
than either book value or dividends for measur-
ing stock market fundamentals. Many analysts
think that book value has become less meaningful
because accounting statements do not adequately
report all of a corporation’s assets, including
software, research, and the intangible value of a
corporation’s franchise. In addition, new account-
ing procedures for retiree health benefits have
reduced book value since 1992 (Cole, Helwege,
and Laster).
15 A recent trend has also made it difficult
for analysts to compare dividend yields with
historical levels. Many companies are distributing
less of their earnings as dividends and instead
distributing more cash to shareholders by buying
back stock.
16 Given the limitations of book value
and dividends, the following analysis uses the
price-earnings ratio to measure stock prices.
The relationship between price-earnings
ratios and long-run returns can be understood
by considering the two components of stock
returns, price growth and dividends. To maintain
price-earnings ratios at their current levels, stock
prices must grow at the same rate as earnings.
That is, stock prices can grow at their long-run
historical rate if earnings continue to grow at this
rate. If the dividend payout ratio is steady,
however, high stock prices imply low dividend
yields. Thus, with average growth in prices and
below-average dividend yields, long-run returns
will be below average. 
Chart 8 illustrates the relationship between
P/E ratios and long-run returns. The relation-
ship, which is derived in the appendix, is defined
by the following equation: 
P/E =  payoutratio
stockreturn - retention ratio ´ return on equity
The chart is based on the assumption that
corporations pay out 40 percent of their after-tax
earnings to shareholders as dividends (payout
ratio) and retain the other 60 percent to increase
equity (retention ratio). These proportions corre-
spond to recent payout and reinvestment ratios
for the S&P 500. In addition, corporations are
ECONOMIC REVIEW · THIRD QUARTER 1997 13assumed to earn 12 percent on their equity (assets
less debt), which is the level assumed by many
industry analysts (Leibowitz and Kogelman).
Under these assumptions, stock returns at the
historical average of 10 percent correspond to a
P/E ratio of 14.3. A rise in the P/E ratio to its
recent level near 22 only requires the return to
drop to 9 percent. That is, recent P/E ratios in the
vicinity of 22 are consistent with a one-percentage-
point decline in the required return on stocks,
from 10 to 9 percent. Thus, because recent P/E
ratios are consistent with only a modest decline
in long-run returns, it is not unreasonable for
some analysts to believe P/E ratios have risen
permanently. 
To sum up, this section shows that increases
in P/E ratios are associated with declines in long-
run returns. The calculations presented here show
that current P/E ratios are consistent with a slight
decline in long-run returns, from 10 to 9 percent.
Many analysts, however, believe high P/E ra-
tios imply stocks are temporarily overvalued,
and they predict price declines will lead to below-
average returns. If prices do decline, of course,
long-run returns could revert to their historical
average. This article does not take a position on
the difficult issue of whether high stock prices
are permanent or temporary. Instead, the analy-
sis shows that if P/E ratios on stocks are perma-
nently high, long-run returns could fall modestly
from their long-run historical average.
Chart 8
P/E RATIO DEPENDS ON LONG-RUN RETURN
Return (percent)
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14 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYWhy might stock returns have declined?
The above analysis suggests that P/E ratios
may be high because long-run returns have
declined. But, what change in the economy
would cause returns to decline? Some analysts
think returns are lower because stocks have
become less risky. The total return on a stock
depends on the size of its risk premium—the
difference between its return and the return on
less risky investments such as U.S. Treasury
bills. If investors perceive that stocks have
become less risky, the risk premium, and there-
fore the total return, will decline.
Researchers who contend that stock returns
have declined offer three reasons why the risk
premium may have declined. First, stocks have
become less volatile. Renshaw, for example,
shows that the maximum annual loss on the S&P
500 has been lower in the 1980s and 1990s than
in previous decades. As another measure of vola-
tility, he calculates the ratio of the market high
to the market low on an intrayear basis for each
year between 1928 and 1994. Over this 67-year
interval, the three least volatile years all occurred
in the 1990s. A third measure of volatility is the
length of time between significant market cor-
rections. The S&P 500 index dropped 9.6 percent
between February 18, 1997, and April 11,1997,
which was the first 9 percent correction in over
six years. Previously, the longest interval between
9 percent corrections was only 20 months, end-
ing in September 1986.
Siegel and Thaler offer a second reason the
risk premium may have declined. They suggest
the risk premium may have been too high in the
past. According to this explanation, investors
are willing to accept a lower return on stocks
because they recognize that stocks are not as
risky over the long run as they previously believed.
Siegel presents evidence to support this view.
He calculates that stocks outperformed bonds
over every 30-year interval since 1871, and that
average stock returns exceeded average bond
returns by 5 percent per year during this period.
17
Recent demographic trends provide a third
reason the risk premium may have declined.
People are generally living longer and many of
them are retiring earlier, so the time horizon for
the typical investor may be increasing. Average
stock returns are less volatile over longer invest-
ment horizons, so investors with long horizons
should view stocks as less risky than investors
with short horizons.
In addition to reducing the risk premium,
demographic trends suggest another reason the
return on stocks may have declined. The tax
code enhances the value of stocks relative to bonds.
Most investor income from stocks is classified
as long-term capital gains, which are taxed at
lower rates than interest payments for many
taxpayers. In addition, capital gains taxes can be
deferred until stocks are sold.
18 Over a 30-year
horizon, Siegel calculates that the value of tax
deferral adds one percentage point to the effective
return on stocks. This tax advantage of stocks
over bonds rises as the investment horizon gets
longer, so investors would accept lower stock
returns as their investment horizon lengthens.
IV. CONCLUSION
Before investors can develop successful finan-
cial plans, they need to have realistic expectations
of long-run stock returns. This article examines
the outlook for long-run stock returns. Although
many individual investors expect the 15 percent
returns of the past decade to continue, their
expectations are not consistent with macro-
economic fundamentals. If official estimates of
the growth of capital, labor, and total factor
productivity are approximately correct, macro-
economic effects could actually reduce returns
a little below their 10 percent historical average.
ECONOMIC REVIEW · THIRD QUARTER 1997 15If productivity is growing a percentage point
faster than official estimates, macroeconomic
effects could raise returns a little. In either case,
however, recent macroeconomic trends will not
change long-run returns much from their histori-
cal average.
Contrary to expectations of continuing 15 per-
cent returns, some analysts believe that returns
could drop below the 10 percent long-run his-
torical average. These analysts suggest that P/E
ratios may be high because stocks have become
less risky, which implies investors are willing to
accept lower long-run returns. Specifically, a
modest decline in long-run returns from 10 to
9 percent would be consistent with a rise in the
P/E ratio from its historical average near 14 to
its recent level near 22. This analysis, of course,
presumes that stock prices remain at elevated
levels. If the price rise is only temporary, near-
term returns will be below average and the
subsequent long-run returns will be about the
same as their historical averages. 
16 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY. – .
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APPENDIX
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LONG-RUN STOCK 
RETURNS AND THE PRICE-EARNINGS RATIO
The relationship between stock returns
and the price-earnings ratio can be devel-
oped from the relationship between a stock’s
return, its price growth, and its dividend
yield. Stock returns (R) are the sum of the
percentage growth in stock prices (GP) plus
the dividend yield (D/P):
R = GP + D/P.  (A1)
In a long-run equilibrium a stock’s price
will rise at the same rate as its fundamentals,
as measured by either earnings, dividends,
or equity. If the company neither issues new
shares nor buys back previously issued
shares, stock prices will grow at the same
rate as equity over the long run. Equity
growth (GE) equals retained earnings (RE)
divided by the initial equity (EQ). Thus,
GP  =  GE  =  RE /EQ. Continuing, retained
earnings equals the retention ratio (RR)
times total earnings (E), and this substitu-
tion implies: GP = RR ´ E /EQ. But, E/EQ
is the return on equity (ROE), so one more
substitution yields: GP  =  ROE  ´  RR. Be-
cause dividends equal earnings times the
payout ratio (PR), the dividend yield can be
rewritten as D/P  =  E  ´  PR/P = PR  P/E.
Substituting these expressions for GP and
D/P into equation A1 yields: 
 R = ROE ´ RR + PO   P/E .  (A2)
Solving equation A2 for the P/E ratio yields:
 P/E = PO/(R-ROE ´ RR) .  (A3)
Given estimates of the retention ratio,
payout ratio, and return on equity, this
expression defines how the P/E ratio de-
pends on long-run stock returns. If the reten-
tion ratio equals 0.6 (payout ratio=0.4) and
the return on equity equals 0.12, the expres-
sion becomes:
P/E = .4/(R-0.072) .  (A4)
ECONOMIC REVIEW · THIRD QUARTER 1997 17ENDNOTES
1 Returns described in this article are nominal rather than
real returns. Although real returns are more important
economically, financial economists in both the business
press and academic journals typically focus on nominal
returns. Economists often ignore the effects of inflation on
stock returns because they are uncertain of the exact
relationship between inflation and returns. 
  Much of the discussion of nominal long-run returns in
this article can be converted to real returns by subtracting
3 percent. Inflation has averaged about 3 percent since
1927, and forecasters expect inflation to be approximately
3 percent over the next decade (Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia).
2 Throughout this article, the S&P 500 index is used as a
broad measure of the stock market. The index includes 500
of the largest U.S. companies, and represents more than 60
percent of the value of publicly traded stocks (the
companies included in the index change over time). Other
sectors of the market generally move in parallel with the
S&P 500 index. Over the past two years, however, small
capitalization stocks have not risen as much as the large
capitalization stocks in the index.
3 The annual returns shown in Chart 1 are based on the
dividends paid during the calendar year and the average
January prices of the following year. 
  Throughout this article, average returns are calculated
arithmetically. Geometric averages, which are arguably
more relevant for long-run investors, are slightly less than
arithmetic averages. The use of arithmetic averages follows
the convention adopted by many articles in the business
press.
4 Siegel calculates that stock returns averaged 9.5 percent
between 1802 and 1992, and averaged 10.3 percent
between 1871 and 1992. The averages would rise slightly
if updated to include recent high returns. This article uses
10 percent as a representative number for historical
long-run returns.
5 The stock market has declined substantially for short
periods, particularly in 1987 and 1990, but year-over-year
returns have been positive in almost every year since 1974.
Returns were also slightly negative over the December 31,
1989 to December 31, 1990 interval, but were positive
based on the average January price used in Chart 1 (see
endnote 3).
6 The number of companies in the Industrials Index has
varied over time, but has usually included about 400
companies. Market-to-book data are shown for the S&P
Industrials Index instead of the S&P 500 index because
data are available further back in time. Even for the
Industrials Index, however, book value data are not
available as far back as dividends and earnings data. The
chart is based on the price and book value at the beginning
of the year. At press time, book value was not yet available
for the beginning of 1997. Book value is assumed to have
grown by 7 percent during 1996, which was the growth rate
in 1995.
7 An example illustrates how the return to capital
determines earnings growth. Consider a company that does
not finance any of its assets with debt, so shareholders’
equity equals the value of the corporation’s physical assets.
Capital growth (gC) equals retained earnings (RE) divided
by the initial capital (C): gC = RE/C. Retained earnings, of
course, equals the retention ratio (RR) times total earnings
(E), so gC = RR ´ E/C. Over the long run, earnings will
grow (gE) at the same rate as capital, so gE = RR ´ E/C.
That is, earnings growth is directly proportional to the
return to capital (E/C).
  In the context of this article, capital always refers to
physical capital. The article does not explicitly consider
human capital, which is also an important element of
economic performance. Corporations own physical capital
and do not own human capital, so corporate earnings
depend primarily on physical capital.
8 Discussions of productivity in the business press typically
refer to labor productivity, which has risen faster than total
factor productivity. One reason workers have become more
productive, however, is that the capital invested per worker
has grown. Total factor productivity measures the increase
in output that cannot be attributed to either capital or labor.
9 As defined in the National Income and Product Accounts
(NIPA), the major categories of capital income are
corporate earnings, interest payments to lenders, and rent
payments to landlords. The NIPA measure of capital
income, however, does not include capital gains and losses
from movements in financial markets.
10 Cobb and Douglas developed a model of economic
production to fit their evidence that the capital and labor
shares of economic output are constant. Chart 6 assumes
that the “proprietor’s income” category of the National
Income and Product Accounts is all capital income.
18 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYEconomists generally recognize that this category includes
some labor income, but they are uncertain about how much.
Some economists, however, estimate labor’s share as 75
percent instead of the 70 percent assumed in the
calculations throughout this paper. A 75 percent labor share
would not change the conclusions of this article.
11 The mathematical form of the Cobb-Douglas model is 
Y = AK aL(1-a), where Y is economic output, A is total
factor productivity, K is capital, L is labor, and a is capital’s
share of output (labor’s share = 1-a ). The return to capital
can be written as aY/K, or aA(L/K)(1-a). From this
relationship, the growth in the return to capital can be
calculated as gR = gA + (1-a)(gL-gK), where gA, gL , and
gK are the growth rates of productivity, labor, and capital,
respectively.
12 Calculations of the capital stock are based on an
approach by Christensen and Jorgenson, who assign
different depreciation rates to different components of the
capital stock. Economists generally recognize that these
capital stock estimates are more accurate than estimates in
the National Income and Product Accounts. Although
economists’ estimates of the capital stock are uncertain, the
conclusions in this article are not sensitive to alternative
measures of the capital stock.
13 As developed in endnote 11, the growth rate for the return
to capital can be calculated as gR = gA + (1-a)(gL-gK),
where gA, gL, and gK are the growth rates of productivity,
labor, and capital. Substituting the estimated growth rates
from the text, gR = .72 + .7 ´ (1.05-2.8) = -0.5 percent per
year. Thus, a 10 percent return would become
10 ´ (1-.005) = 9.95 percent after one year. After declining
at 0.5 percent per year for ten years, a 10 percent return
would decline to 10 ´ (1-.005)10 = 9.5 percent.
  A potential weakness of the constant-share growth
model is that all capital is lumped into a single category.
That is, the model describes how changes in the
macroeconomy will affect the return on aggregate capital,
not the return on a specific type of capital such as corporate
equity. The returns on different subcategories of capital, of
course, depend on the their risk characteristics.
Nevertheless, if the relative risk and relative return of the
subcategories do not change, changes in the return on
aggregate capital will also apply to the subcategories. 
14 Although economists are uncertain about the bias in the
consumer price index, many estimate the index overstates
inflation by about 1 percent. If true, this would imply that
total factor productivity has grown about 1 percent per year
faster than estimated by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
15 Cole, Helwege, and Laster calculate the effects of
Financial Accounting Standard 106, which changed the
accounting procedures for retiree health benefits, on the
book value of the S&P Industrials Index. They find the
accounting change reduced book value in 1992 and 1993,
but the change only partially explains recent high
market-to-book value ratios.
16 Cole, Helwege, and Laster conclude that dividend yields
appear low relative to historical averages even after
adjusting for stock buybacks and new issues.
17 Siegel’s book (page 31), Stocks for the Long Run,
compares stock returns to U.S. Treasury bond returns over
different horizons. To extend his analysis back to 1802
when data on Treasury securities are unavailable, Siegel
used interest rates on other high-quality debt.
18 Some mutual funds buy and sell stocks frequently.
Investors in these funds with “high turnover” are unable to
defer taxes on their capital gains. Investors in index funds
and individual stocks, however, are able to defer capital
gains taxes.
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